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Abstract 
 
The paper presents a rational political business cycle model 
where voters are imperfectly informed about both incumbent 
competence and incumbent preferences. The model predicts that 
election cycles on real variables are observed mainly when the 
incumbent is right-wing and unpopular. The model is put to 
test on a data set comprising 56 elections in eight OECD 
countries. Opinion poll series have been collected for each 
election campaign to compute estimates of the government's re-
election chances. The results are broadly consistent with the 
theoretical model: there is evidence of abnormal pre-election 
decreases in unemployment and increases in output when right 
parties hold office and re-election prospects are poor but 
otherwise not.  
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1. Introduction
 
The political business cycle (PBC) model pioneered by Nordhaus 
(1975) features the idea that governments create high growth 
and falling unemployment before elections in order to be re-
elected. After the election, contractive policies are 
implemented to bring down inflationary pressure and clear the 
deck for future expansions.   
 
Despite ample evidence that the economy affects the electoral 
fortunes of the ruling party or parties (Nannestad and Paldam, 
1994; Mueller, 2003), the PBC model has not fared well in 
empirical tests. Most studies fail to find evidence of 
systematic election cycles in which growth surges and 
unemployment falls in the year or two before elections.1 
 
The policy ineffectiveness argument of Lucas (1973) and 
Sargent and Wallace (1975) provides one possible explanation 
for the lack of empirical support for the PBC model. Persson 
and Tabellini (1990) and Lohmann (1998) have developed 
rational political business cycle (RPBC) models where only 
unanticipated inflation has real effects and voters are 
imperfectly informed about the true supply function (the 
policymaker's 'competence'). Their models imply that, in 
equilibrium, some or all types of incumbent conduct expansive 
policies before elections in order to be perceived as 
competent. But since agents understand these incentives, pre-
election policies have on average no impact on real variables. 
 
As emphasized by Drazen (2000) in his survey of the PBC 
                     
1Surveys of empirical tests of Nordhaus cycles include Alesina et al. 
(1997), Drazen (2000) and Franzese (2002). 
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literature, the notion that movements in economic activity are 
driven by inflation surprises is controversial. During the 
last years, several empirical investigations have found 
evidence of a long-run trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment.2 Theoretical models consistent with a non-
vertical long-run Phillips curve have recently been developed 
by Cukierman and Lippi (1999), Akerlof et al. (2000), Holden 
(2004) and Karanassou et al. (2005).  
 
The model presented here goes some way towards explaining why 
regular election cycles on unemployment and growth are not 
observed without imposing policy ineffectiveness as a model 
assumption. The model predicts regular pre-election expansions 
only when right parties hold office, and then mainly when the 
incumbent's re-election chances are poor. 
 
Whereas RPBC models assume that voters have incomplete 
information about government competence but complete 
information about government preferences, a large literature 
surveyed by Walsh (2003) has examined the implications of 
uncertainty about the policymaker's preferences for monetary 
policy. Several papers, including Alesina and Cukierman (1990) 
and Cukierman and Tommasi (1998), study electoral competition 
when voters are imperfectly informed about party preferences. 
However, none of these contributions have studied 
opportunistic macroeconomic policies of the Nordhaus type.   
 
This paper develops a RPBC model where voters are imperfectly 
                     
2See, eg., King and Watson (1994), Brainard and Perry (2000) and Fair 
(2000) for the US, Koustas (1998) for Canada, and Dolado et al. (2000), 
Lundborg and Sacklén (2001), Karanassou et al. (2003) and Koustas and 
Serletis (2003) for various EU countries. 
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informed about both government competence and government 
preferences.3 Incomplete information about preferences may for 
instance be due to changes in the leadership of the ruling 
party or variation in the relative influence of the groups 
which form the government's constituency. In order not to rule 
out election cycles of the Nordhaus type a priori, I allow 
both unanticipated and anticipated policy changes to have real 
effects. 
 
The reason why my model generates distinct predictions for 
right and left incumbents is that the incumbent benefits at 
the polls from being perceived as moderate, i.e. with 
preferences close to those of the median voter. In 
equilibrium, some left incumbents - with centrist preferences 
- conduct contractive policies prior to elections to signal 
their true preferences. Other left incumbents - with a 
favourable supply function - conduct expansive policies to 
signal their true competence. In contrast, both right 
incumbents with centrist preferences and right incumbents with 
a favourable supply function generate pre-election expansions. 
Right incumbents therefore on average conduct more expansive 
pre-election policies than left incumbents, and the difference 
is larger the less popular is the incumbent prior to the 
election. 
 
The model is put to test on a data set which comprises 56 
elections in eight OECD countries. To compute estimates of the 
government's re-election chances prior to an election, monthly 
                     
3A companion paper (Carlsen 2006) considers the case with asymmetric 
information about preferences but symmetric information about competence. 
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or quarterly opinion poll series have been collected for each 
election campaign.    
 
The empirical evidence conforms well to the theoretical model. 
When right parties hold office, there is evidence of abnormal 
decreases in unemployment and abnormal increases in output 
during the last quarters prior to an election if the incumbent 
election win probability is low. The estimated effects are 
strongest in countries without an independent central bank. 
There is no evidence of election cycles on unemployment and 
output when left parties hold office. The main conclusions 
survive several robustness tests. 
 
Three decades ago, Frey and Schneider (1978a,b) argued that 
governments have both ideological and opportunistic goals, and 
that the latter becomes more important the less favourable are 
the government's re-election prospects. Election cycles will 
therefore be observed mainly when incumbent popularity is low. 
Their contribution did not catch on particularly well in the 
PBC literature, partly because the argument was not based on a 
formal model with rational agents, and partly because other 
scholars, including Alt and Chrystal (1981,1983) and Ahmad 
(1983), questioned the robustness of their empirical results. 
The model presented here provides microfoundations for the 
link between opportunistic policies and incumbent popularity 
suggested by Frey and Schneider, but only for right-wing 
governments.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents 
the basic model, and section 3 characterizes the equilibrium 
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outcome. Section 4 presents the data set, section 5 presents 
the empirical results, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The basic model 
 
We consider a two-period economy. In each period t, t = 1,2, 
the policymaker sets inflation, πt.4  
 
Whereas most RPBC models use a standard Lucas-style supply 
function, we employ a supply function where real activity 
depends both on surprise inflation and expected inflation. The 
employment rate (or output growth), xt, is given by 
 
     xt = xt* + γ1(πt - πte) + γ2πte + φt,   γ1 ≥ γ2 > 0,       (1) 
 
where φt is the policymaker's competence, xt* is the natural 
growth rate at zero inflation and zero competence, and πte is 
expected inflation. The supply function of most RPBC models is 
a special case of (1) where γ2 = 0. Our supply function can be 
interpreted as a non-vertical Phillips curve where the short-
run slope is -γ1 and the long-run slope is –γ2. An attractive 
feature of (1) is that systematic pre-election cycles in real 
variables are not assumed away a priori.5 In the following, xt* 
is normalized to zero.  
 
Two parties compete for office, 'right' and 'left'. At the end 
of period one, the incumbent party faces the opposition party 
                     
4To save space, we do not model the link between inflation and policy 
instrument(s).  
 
5Ellis and Thoma (1993) employ a modified version of (1) to study how 
elections affect the policymaker's time inconsistency problem. 
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in an electoral contest, and the winner becomes policymaker in 
period two. The electorate consists of a representative 
(median) voter whose utility function is written as: 
 
        
2
1t=
∑ δt-1[U(xt,πt,αM) + μt],  1 ≥ δ > 0, 
                                                        (2)  
             U(xt,πt,α) = αxt - (πt)2/2,  
 
where U(xt,πt,α) is one-period payoff associated with economic 
outcomes, denoted economic welfare, α characterizes an agent's 
preferences for employment versus inflation, and μt is a 
preference term which captures attributes of the policymaker 
not related to the economy. The opposition party's preference 
term is normalized to zero. The preference term of the 
incumbent party, μ, is assumed to be the same in both periods 
and given by 
 
              μ = p + p'.                                   (3)  
 
Incumbent popularity, p, is common knowledge and characterizes 
the incumbent's re-election chances prior to the game. p' is a 
random variable which represents electoral uncertainty faced 
by the incumbent when first period inflation is determined. 
The density and cumulative distribution functions of p' are 
denoted f(p') and F(p'), respectively.  
 
RPBC models assume that the incumbent maximizes a weighted 
average of social welfare (here: economic welfare) and the 
expected intrinsic benefits of election victory. The weights 
are assumed to be independent of the election outcome. 
Recently, Schultz (1995), Lockwood et al. (1996) and 
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Economides et al. (2003) have argued that the latter 
assumption is unrealistic; the incumbent party is likely to 
care most about social welfare when in power. Consistent with 
their argument, the utility function of party i, i = R,L, is 
written as 
 
  K + U(x1,π1,αi) + δU(x2,π2,αi)    if the party wins   
                                                           (4) 
                  U               if the party looses,   
 
where αL > αM > αR.6 K > 0 is the intrinsic value of second 
period power. The intrinsic value of first period power is 
normalized to zero. In the following, U is also normalized to 
zero.  
 
The competence of the incumbent party, φ, is assumed to be the 
same in both periods.7 The competence of the opposition party 
is normalized to zero. Incumbent competence as well as 
incumbent preferences (αi when party i is incumbent) cannot be 
observed by the voter. The voter cannot infer φ from the 
supply function before casting his/her vote as x1 but not π1 is 
observed prior to the election.8 π1 is observed at the 
beginning of period two and before π2e is formed. To simplify 
the exposition, the opposition party's competence (zero) as 
well as preferences (denoted αi-) are assumed to be common 
                     
6There is evidence that supporters of left parties are relatively more 
concerned about unemployment whereas supporters of right parties are 
particularly averse to inflation (Hibbs 1987). 
7Most RPBC models assume that competence follows a MA(1) process. In our 
model, my formulation and the standard formulation are equivalent. 
8Persson and Tabellini (1999) discuss this assumption, which is standard in 
RPBC models. 
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knowledge; this assumption is trivial as the opposition party 
is passive before the election. 
 
The incumbent is one of three types: 'normal' (type 0), 
'competent' (type 1) and 'moderate' (type 2). The competence 
and preference parameters of the three types are: 
 
           Right incumbent             Left incumbent 
Type 0:  φ = 0      αR = αR0          φ = 0      αL = αL0   
Type 1:  φ = θ > 0  αR = αR1 = αR0    φ = θ > 0  αL = αL1 = αL0 
Type 2:  φ = 0      αR = αR2 > αR0    φ = 0      αL = αL2 < αL0. 
 
Compared to a normal incumbent, a competent incumbent has a 
favourable supply function whereas a moderate incumbent has 
preferences which are closer to those of the median voter.9 The 
voter's prior beliefs about the incumbent's type are given by 
the probability distribution η0 (= 1-η1-η2), η1 and η2. The 
posterior beliefs conditional on x1 are given by the 
distribution η0 (= 1-η1-η2), η1 and η2.  
 
3. Equilibrium outcome 
 
It follows from (1), (2) and (4) that the election winner sets 
   
          αijγ1 = π*ij   if an incumbent of type j wins   
     π2 =                                                  (5) 
           αi-γ1 = π*i-   if the opponent wins, 
 
i = R,L; j = 0,2. The election winner's type is either known 
                     
9For tractability, we do not introduce an incumbent with a favourable 
supply function and moderate preferences.   
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before the election (if the opponent wins) or becomes known 
when π1 is observed (if the incumbent wins).10 Second period 
inflation expectations are therefore correct, implying that  
 
 
         αi0γ1γ2       if an incumbent of type 0 wins   
         αi0γ1γ2 + θ   if an incumbent of type 1 wins  
  x2  =                                                    (6) 
         αi2γ1γ2       if an incumbent of type 2 wins 
         αi-γ1γ2       if the opponent wins. 
 
From (2), (5) and (6), we can derive the voter's expected 
second period economic welfare, EU(x2,π2,αM). 
 
              αM{[(1-η2)αi0 + η2αi2]γ1γ2 + η1θ} - [(1-η2)(αi0)2  
              + η2(αi2)2](γ1)2/2           if the incumbent wins 
EU(x2,π2,αM) =                                                (7) 
              αMαi-γ1γ2 - (αi-γ1)2/2       if the opponent wins. 
 
The voter chooses the party which maximizes expected second 
period utility. From (2), (3) and (7), it follows that the 
incumbent will be re-elected if 
 
   p' > -p + αM{[αi- - (1-η2)αi0 - η2αi2]γ1γ2 - η1θ}  
        - [(αi-)2 - (1-η2)(αi0)2 - η2(αi2)2](γ1)2/2,  
 
implying that the re-election probability, P(p,η1,η2), is 
 
                     
10Strictly speaking, we must assume that the supply functions of type 0 and 
type 2 differ by an infinitesimal amount. The voter cannot otherwise 
distinguish between the two types by observing first period inflation. 
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P(p,η1,η2) = 1 - F{-p + αM{[αi- - (1-η2)αi0 - η2αi2]γ1γ2 - η1θ}  
             - [(αi-)2 - (1-η2)(αi0)2 - η2(αi2)2](γ1)2/2}.          (8) 
 
We see from (8) that the incumbent's election win probability 
is increasing in popularity, p, as well as in η1; the voter is 
more inclined to vote for a competent than a normal incumbent. 
An increase in η2 raises the incumbent win probability if 
 
      (αi0 - αi2) [2αMγ2 - (αi0 + αi2)γ1] < 0.               (9)   
 
This inequality is satisfied when party left is incumbent as γ1 
≥ γ2 and αL0 > αL2 > αM. For a right incumbent, (9) is satisfied 
if 2αMγ2 > (αR0 + αR2)γ1, which holds unless γ2 is small compared 
to γ1.11 In the following, I will assume that (9) holds for 
both parties, implying that the voter prefers a moderate to a 
normal incumbent. 
 
When the re-election chances of competent and moderate 
incumbents are better than those of normal incumbents and the 
incumbent's type cannot be observed prior to the election, 
normal incumbents have incentives to imitate competent and/or 
moderate incumbents whereas the latter have incentives to 
signal that they are not normal. Whether a normal incumbent 
prefers to imitate the other types depends on the expected 
benefits and costs of deviating from the optimal short-run 
                     
11If γ2 is close to zero, the ideology of the policymaker is unimportant for 
employment, in which case the voter prefers a very conservative policymaker 
due to the low inflation inconsistency problem. There is, however, evidence 
that post-election employment and growth depend on the ideology of the 
election winner: employment and growth are generally higher after a left 
election victory (Alesina et al., 1997; Carlsen, 1998; Carlsen and Pedersen, 
1999).  
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inflation rate, π*i0. If K is small and/or imitation has only a 
modest effect on the win probability, a normal incumbent 
prefers π1 = π*i0 also when the other types choose their optimal 
short-run inflation rates. Then election cycles do not take 
place (unless competent and moderate incumbents imitate each 
other).  
 
In the following, we consider the more interesting case where 
a normal incumbent prefers to mimick a competent incumbent 
choosing π*i0 (= π*i1) and/or a moderate incumbent choosing π*i2. 
Whether this signalling game has a unique sequential 
equilibrium depends on parameter values and restrictions 
placed on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We assume that the 
intrinsic value of victory, K, is large compared to economic 
welfare, implying that the impact of a change in the incumbent 
election win probability on expected economic welfare is small 
relative to the impact on the expected intrinsic value of 
power. Ignoring the effect on expected economic welfare will 
simplify the analysis considerably. 
 
Concerning out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the ‘intuitive 
criterion’ is often used to eliminate potential equilibria of 
signalling games. However, the intuitive criterion has little 
to say about out-of-equilibrium beliefs in our game. We 
therefore use the somewhat stronger ‘D1 criterion’ (Cho and 
Kreps, 1987). This criterion says that if a type j incumbent 
wishes to deviate from a potential equilibrium to x1 = x' 
whenever a type j- incumbent wishes to deviate to x1 = x', the 
voter will conclude that the incumbent is not type j- when x' 
is observed. In our game, the D1 criterion selects a unique 
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sequential equilibrium for most parameter values. Proposition 
1 characterizes the equilibrium outcome. 
 
Proposition 1. i) Right incumbent. If K >> U(xt,πt,αR) and θ > 
θ' or θ < θ'', where θ' = (αR2-αR0)(γ1)2 and θ'' = θ'[γ2/γ1 - 
(αR2+αR0)/2αM] < θ', the D1 criterion selects a unique and fully 
separating equilibrium where 
 
           π*R0              if the incumbent is normal  
      π1 = πR1 > π*R0        if the incumbent is competent  
           πR2 > π*R2        if the incumbent is moderate. 
 
πR1 and πR2 are both decreasing in popularity, p. 
 
ii) Left incumbent. If K >> U(xt,πt,αL), the D1 criterion 
selects a unique and fully separating equilibrium where 
 
           π*L0              if the incumbent is normal  
      π1 = πL1 > π*L0        if the incumbent is competent  
           πL2 < π*L2        if the incumbent is moderate. 
 
πL1 (πL2) is decreasing (increasing) in p. 
  
Proof: See appendix A. 
 
Except for the special case where party right is incumbent and 
θ' ≥ θ ≥ θ'', the D1 criterion eliminates all but one 
sequential equilibrium, the fully separating equilibrium where 
competent and moderate incumbents set first period inflation 
sufficiently above or below their optimal short-run inflation 
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rates to prevent imitation from other incumbents.12 The 
intuition behind the proposition is the following. 
 
For a given level of employment, the costs of raising first 
period employment and inflation in terms of foregone economic 
welfare are smaller for competent incumbents than for normal 
incumbents as the former have a more favourable supply 
function. The costs of raising first period employment and 
inflation are also smaller for moderate right incumbents than 
for normal right incumbents since the former are relatively 
more concerned about employment than inflation, but larger for 
moderate left incumbents than for normal left incumbents as 
the former care relatively more about inflation. Therefore, in 
order to achieve separation, competent incumbents and moderate 
right incumbents set first period inflation above their 
respective optimal short-run inflation rates, whereas moderate 
left incumbents set first period inflation below the optimal 
short-run inflation rate. 
 
In period two, all types of incumbent choose the optimal 
short-run inflation rate. Average inflation is therefore 
higher in period one than in period two when party right is 
incumbent. The relation between average first and second 
period inflation is ambiguous when party left is incumbent; 
average inflation is roughly equal in the two periods if πL1- 
π *L0 ≅ π*L2-πL2 and η1 ≅ η2.  
 
A decrease in incumbent popularity, p, makes incumbents more 
                     
12When party right is incumbent and θ' ≥ θ ≥ θ'', several pooling equilibria 
are accepted by the D1 criterion. Some of these imply election cycles on 
real variables whereas others do not. 
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inclined to mimick types with a higher win probability. The 
reason is that the expected cost of deviating from the optimal 
short-run inflation rate is increasing in the win probability 
and therefore in popularity. Competent and moderate incumbents 
respond to a decrease in popularity by moving first period 
inflation further away from the respective optimal short-run 
inflation rates. Average first period inflation is therefore a 
decreasing function of popularity when party right is 
incumbent. The impact of popularity on average first period 
inflation is ambiguous when party left is incumbent. 
 
It follows from the supply function (1) that average inflation 
determines average employment when expectations are rational. 
The model thus predicts that election cycles on real variables 
will be observed when party right is incumbent but not 
necessarily when party left is incumbent. Election cycles 
under right incumbents will be more pronounced the less 
popular is the incumbent party at the beginning of the 
election campaign.    
 
4. Data description and computation of win probabilities 
 
We now put the model to test. In multi-party countries, most 
elections leave open several coalition possibilities, and 
there is often no unambiguous link between the election result 
and government formation; a party may join the ruling 
coalition or continue in office after a bad election result, 
or leave government or remain in opposition after a good 
result. I therefore confine the empirical analysis to eight 
countries where national politics is or has been dominated by 
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two parties or party blocs clearly delineated by the 
left/right borderline: United States, Canada, United Kingdom, 
Germany, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden and Norway. In these 
countries, government has with few exceptions been formed by 
the largest party or, in the two-bloc systems, by one or more 
parties from the largest bloc. 
 
Some of these countries have variable electoral terms. 
Endogenous timing suggests the possibility of reverse 
causality as a government may choose to call an election when 
economic forecasts are favourable. Another possible 
consequence of endogenous timing is that early elections are 
preceded by economic downturns since a recession may create or 
exacerbate conflicts within the ruling party or coalition that 
force the government to go to the polls before the maximum 
interval between elections has elapsed. To avoid problems of 
interpretation, elections called earlier than six months 
before the mandatory election date are excluded from the data 
set.13  
 
The government's re-election chances prior to the election 
cannot be observed and must be estimated. For this purpose, 
monthly or quarterly opinion poll series have been collected. 
The sample comprises 56 elections for which polls are 
available during at least seven quarters before the election 
quarter. Right parties or party blocs were incumbent in 29 of 
these elections. Appendix B lists the elections included, the 
right and left parties/blocs and the sources of opinion polls.  
                     
13Keesing's record of world events gives information about the day of 
announcement. 
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Since government is usually formed by the party or party bloc 
receiving the highest number of votes, the probability of 
obtaining more than 50% of the two-party/two-bloc vote share 
is a good approximation to the probability that the incumbent 
party/bloc continues in office. To check that the empirical 
results are robust with respect to the choice of estimation 
procedure, two alternative quarterly probability series are 
computed. The first series, PAt, is based on the election 
option model developed by Cohen (1993).14 The second series, 
PBt, is derived from vote prediction equations using an 
approach suggested by Chappell and Keech (1988). 
 
The election option model converts vote intention polls to 
election win probabilities. Let T denote the election quarter 
and POLLt the two-party/two-bloc vote share obtained by the 
government in polls conducted during quarter t. If POLLt 
follows a random walk with zero mean and is an unbiased 
estimate of the election result, the probability that the 
government obtains a majority of the two-party/two-bloc votes 
can be approximated as 
 
  PAt = NO[(POLLt-0.5)/σt(T-t)½],                          (10) 
       
where NO(.) is the cumulative standard normal distribution and 
σt is the standard deviation of quarter-to-quarter changes in 
POLLt. The assumptions underlying the election option model are 
supported by the data: for every country, the hypothesis that 
changes in POLLt are serially uncorrelated, normally 
                     
14For brevity, subscripts for country are omitted throughout the section. 
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distributed and have zero mean is accepted. Furthermore, the 
average difference between the last polls and the election 
result is small and statistically insignificant. PAt is 
computed from (10) using, for each election campaign, 
estimates of σt based on observations ending seven quarters 
prior to the election.15  
 
The second probability series, PBt, is computed from a set of 
prediction equations explaining the government's election 
result as a function of polls and macroeconomic variables. To 
expand the number of observations available for prediction 
regressions, I also use elections called earlier than six 
months before the mandatory election date but more than seven 
quarters after the last election. The following regression is 
estimated across elections for each country and for each of 
the seven last quarters before an election, T-κ, κ  = 1,7: 
 
 VOTET = β0κ + 
1
S
s=
∑ {β1κsPOLLT-κ-s + MACROT-κ-sβ2κs}, κ  = 1,7,       
                       
where VOTET is the two-party/two-bloc vote share obtained by 
the government party/bloc, MACROT-κ-s is a vector of 
macroeconomic variables dated κ+s quarters before the election 
quarter, and S is the maximum number of lags (set equal to 
three to reduce the set of potential regressors).16,17  
                     
15If the number of observations before the first election campaign or 
campaigns is small, estimates of σt for this election or these elections are 
computed from observations which include the first 2-3 elections. 
16Election statistics are from Mackie and Rose (1991) and various issues of 
the European Journal of Political Research and Electoral Studies.  
17For the US, the presidential approval rate is also included as regressor. 
In Canada, the UK and Australia, there is evidence that left governments 
consistently perform worse in elections than in polls. Therefore, a partisan 
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MACROT-κ-s includes the level and yearly change in unemployment, 
the quarterly or yearly change in real GDP, whichever performs 
best, and the level and yearly change in inflation.  
 
For each regression, I choose the specification which 
minimizes the standard error, subject to a set of parameter 
constraints stating that none of the macroeconomic variables 
may have implausible effects on the election result.18 Based on 
the preferred specifications, quarterly estimates of the 
standard deviation of the forecasting error, σfT-κ, are computed 
from each regression. The incumbent election win probability 
is computed as 
 
    PBT-κ = ST[(ET-κVOTET-0.5)/σfT-κ], κ = 1,7, 
 
where ST[.] is the cumulative student-t distribution and  
ET-κVOTET is fitted vote share. 
 
The panel data set correlation between PAt and PBt is 0.563. The 
high and positive correlation reflects that POLLt is a 
determinant of the election vote in most prediction equations. 
Plots reveal that both probability series are close to 
uniformly distributed but with largest density at the tails. 
The median observations are, respectively, 0.485 (PAt) and 
0.449 (PBt). 
 
5. Results 
                                                                            
dummy is included in the vote equations of these countries. 
18For instance, lags of inflation may not cumulatively raise the election 
vote of the government. It turns out that the constraints have limited 
effect on the choice of specification. 
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We now present panel data regressions for unemployment and 
output growth. Since unit root tests do not reject that 
unemployment is nonstationary, the dependent variables are, 
respectively, quarterly absolute change in seasonally adjusted 
unemployment (ΔUNit) and quarterly rate of change of seasonally 
adjusted real GDP (GDPit). Subscripts i and t refer to country 
and quarter. Appendix B provides details on the variables.  
 
For each dependent variable, the following panel regressions 
on quarterly observations are estimated: 
       
Xit = β0i +  β1XOit + 
5
1s=
∑ (β2sXit-s + β3sXOit-s) 
      + β4ELENitHIGHjit-r + β5ELENitLOWjit-r + ζit,       
 
j = A,B, where Xit refers to the respective dependent variables 
(ΔUNit and GDPit), XOit is the corresponding OECD variable (GDPOit 
and ΔUNOit, see Appendix B), β0i is a set of country specific 
fixed effects and ζit is a random disturbance. XOit and lags of 
XOit are included to control for effects of the world economy 
on the domestic economy. ELENit is an election dummy variable 
defined as: 
 
          1  in the election quarter and the preceding  
             N-1 quarters 
ELENit = 
          0  otherwise.   
 
HIGHjit  and LOWjit are dummy variables turned on if the 
government's election win probability exceeds or is below a 
threshold, p:  
                           
                1  if Pjit ≥ p 
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     HIGHjit =  
                0  otherwise 
       
 
     LOWjit = 1 - HIGHjit, j = A,B. 
 
The election dummy is interacted with HIGHjit-r and LOWjit-r to 
examine how the performance of the economy before the election 
depends on the government's re-election chances. The lag 
parameter, r, captures lags between movements in the 
government's re-election chances and economic activity. A 
dichotomous representation of the win probability is chosen as 
preliminary analyses suggest that the relation between pre-
election movements in economic activity and the win 
probability is non-linear. 
 
Separate regressions are estimated for right and left 
governments. The theoretical model predicts that the 
coefficients of the political variables (ELENitHIGHjit-r and 
ELENitLOWjit-r) are small when left parties hold office. When 
right parties hold office, the coefficients should be negative 
for change in unemployment and positive for output growth. The 
model also predicts that election cycles under right 
incumbents are strongest if re-election chances are poor, i.e. 
that the coefficient of ELENitLOWjit-r is larger in absolute 
value than the coefficient of ELENitHIGHjit-r. 
 
For all reported regressions, I choose the lag structure and 
the set of country dummy variables that perform best in terms 
of Akaike's information criterion. 
   
Table 1 presents least-squares estimates for N = 4, r = 4 and  
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p = 0.4. Reported t-statistics are White-corrected for 
heteroscedasticity; there is no evidence of autocorrelation in 
the residuals. 
 
               - Table 1 about here - 
 
The results are broadly consistent with the theoretical model. 
There is no evidence of election cycles on unemployment and 
output when left parties hold office.  
 
When right parties hold office, the coefficients of 
ELE4itHIGHjit-4 and ELE4itLOWjit-4 have the expected signs, 
negative for change in unemployment and positive for output 
growth. Also as expected, the estimated effects are strongest 
when the win probability is low: the coefficient of 
ELE4itLOWjit-4 is statistically significant at the 1 percent or 5 
percent confidence level in every regression, whereas the 
coefficient of ELE4itHIGHjit-4 is smaller in absolute value and 
always insignificant. The results imply that the quarterly 
change in unemployment is about 0.1 percentage points below 
normal and average quarterly GDP growth about 0.5 percentage 
points above normal during the year before the election if the 
win probability is low and right parties hold office. The 
corresponding cumulative effects are approximately 0.7 
percentage points lower unemployment and 2% higher output and 
the end of the election quarter.  
 
Sensitivity analysis. The main results do not depend on the 
procedure used to compute the win probability: as is evident 
from table 1, PAt and PBt produce very similar estimates. To 
further examine the robustness of the results, I consider 
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several variations in empirical specification and data sample. 
To conserve space, only coefficients of political variables 
are presented, and additional regressions are not reported for 
left incumbents; the political variables are always 
insignificant when left parties hold office. 
 
The first robustness check is to estimate the basic equations 
removing one election at a time. The coefficients and  
t-statistics of the political variables are hardly affected, 
implying that none of the main conclusions are driven by 
individual elections.  
 
               - Table 2 about here - 
 
Table 2 presents results for alternative values of N, r and 
p. Again, the results appear to be robust. For all             
combinations of N, r and p, and for both probability series, 
the coefficient of ELENitLOWjit-r has the expected sign and is 
significant at the 5 percent confidence level (change in 
unemployment) or the 1 percent confidence level (output 
growth). The coefficient of ELENitHIGHjit-r is smaller in 
absolute value and always insignificant.   
 
               - Table 3 about here -  
 
The third robustness check is to instrument the political 
variables. Since the political variables are generated 
regressors, standard errors may be biased unless the variables 
are instrumented (Pagan, 1984). Table 3 presents instrumental 
variables estimates using as instruments lags of POLLit and 
lags of orders of POLLit interacted with ELE4it. Comparison with 
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table 1 shows that neither coefficients nor t-statistics are 
much altered. 
 
               - Table 4 about here -             
 
Selection bias is a potential issue as early elections have 
been omitted. Table 4 presents regression results for two 
subsamples: countries with fixed electoral terms (US, New 
Zealand, Sweden, Norway) and countries with variable electoral 
terms (UK, Canada, Germany, Australia).19 In both subsamples, 
there is evidence of election cycles on unemployment and 
output when the win probability is low. The estimated effects 
are strongest in countries with fixed electoral terms, 
suggesting that the main results are not driven by selection 
bias.   
 
As a final robustness test, I include more than two (up to 
ten) interaction terms between ELENit and dummy variables for 
intervals of Pjit-r. The results (not reported) confirm that 
pre-election movements in unemployment and output are observed 
mainly when the win probability is low (below 0.3-0.5). 
  
Central bank independence. We conclude the section by 
comparing results for countries with different degrees of 
central bank independence (CBI). If election cycles on 
unemployment and output are generated by monetary policies 
rather than by fiscal policies, we would expect the results to 
be weak in countries with a relatively independent central 
                     
19 For practical purposes, New Zealand can be considered to have fixed 
electoral terms as the cabinet's discretion to determine the election date 
is very limited. 
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bank. According to the CBI index developed by Cukierman 
(1992), the countries in my data set with the most independent 
central banks are the US, Canada, Germany and Australia.20 
Table 5 presents estimates for two subsamples: the high CPI 
sample consists of these four countries and New Zealand since 
1990; the low CPI sample consists of the other countries and 
New Zealand before 1990. 
 
               - Table 5 about here - 
 
Consistent with expectations, there is stronger evidence of 
pre-election movements in unemployment and output in low CPI 
countries than in high CPI countries. This suggests that 
election cycles on real variables are at least partly 
generated by monetary policies, and that the scope for 
opportunistic manipulation of the economy is reduced by the 
presence of an independent central bank. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Lack of empirical evidence of election cycles on real 
variables has been interpreted as supportive evidence of RPBC 
models where movements in economic activity are driven by 
inflation surprises. This paper has shown that the evidence on 
unemployment and output is consistent with a RPBC model where 
anticipated policy changes have real effects and voters are 
imperfectly informed about both government competence and 
government preferences.  
 
                     
20 The elections in my data set precede the formation of the EMU.  
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The model presented here suggests two reasons why regular 
election cycles of the Nordhaus type are not observed. First, 
some left incumbents conduct contractive rather than expansive 
policies before elections in order to develop a reputation for 
being 'tough on inflation'. Second, election cycles involve 
costs. When re-election prospects are favourable, these costs 
are high relative to the electoral gains. The empirical 
evidence is consistent with these explanations. The evidence 
also suggests a third explanation: the scope for opportunistic 
manipulation of the economy is reduced by the presence of an 
independent central bank. 
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Appendix  A 
 
The incumbent election win probabilities in a fully separating 
equilibrium are, respectively, P(p,0,0) (type 0), P(p,1,0) 
(type 1) and P(p,0,1) (type 2). Throughout the proof, 
P(p,1,0)-P(p,0,0), P(p,0,1)-P(p,0,0), P(p,0,1)-P(p,1,0) and 
P(p,1,0)-P(p,0,1) are denoted, respectively, ΔP(p,1,0), 
ΔP(p,2,0), ΔP(p,2,1) and ΔP(p,1,2). 
 
i) Right incumbent. Let P(x1) denote the win probability when 
the incumbent chooses x1, dP(x1) the marginal win probability 
with respect to x1, and dUj(x1) and MEj(x1) the marginal 
expected utility and the marginal first period economic 
welfare of type j with respect to x1. It follows from (4) that 
dUj(x1) can be written as 
 
 dUj(x1) = P(x1) MEj(x1) + dP(x1) [K + U(x1,π1,αRj) + δU(j)],  
 
where U(j) is second period economic welfare if the incumbent 
wins the election. Since, by assumption, economic welfare is 
small relative to K, dUj(x1) can be approximated as  
 
   dUj(x1) = P(x1) MEj(x1) + dP(x1) K. 
 
It follows that dUj(x1) > dUj-(x1) iff MEj(x1) > MEj-(x1). From 
(1), MEj can be written as   
 
     ME0 = αR0 - π1/γ1    
     ME1 = αR0 - (π1-θ/γ1)/γ1   
     ME2 = αR2 - π1/γ1, 
where π1 is the inflation rate of type 0 and type 2 (the 
inflation rate of type 1 is π1-θ/γ1). Hence, we have that ME1 > 
ME0 and ME2 > ME0. ME1 > ME2 if θ > (αR2-αR0)(γ1)2 = θ'.  
 
Consider next the relation between the win probabilities of 
 
 
 28
type 1 and type 2. (8) implies that P(p,1,0) > P(p,0,1) if  
 
   θ > (αR2-αR0)γ1[γ2 - γ1(αR2+αR0)/2αM]  
     = θ'[γ2/γ1 - (αR2+αR0)/2αM] = θ'' < θ'. 
 
There are three possible cases: θ > θ', θ' ≥ θ ≥ θ'', and θ < 
θ''. We consider these in turn. 
 
a) θ > θ'. In this case the ranking of win probabilities is 
identical to the ranking of MEj and therefore of dUj as 
P(p,1,0) > P(p,0,1) > P(p,0.0) and ME1 > ME2 > ME0. Then the 
Spence-Mirrlees sorting condition is satisfied, and the D1 
criterion selects a unique equilibrium, the generalized Riley 
equilibrium (see Cho and Kreps, 1987). In this equilibrium, 
type 0 chooses its optimal short-run inflation rate, π*R0, type 
2 chooses the inflation rate, πR2, which makes type 0 
indifferent between its employment rate, x*R0, and the 
employment rate of type 2, xR2. Type 1 chooses the inflation 
rate, πR1, which makes type 2 indifferent between xR2 and the 
employment rate of type 1, xR1.  
 
Since ME2 > ME0, separation of type 0 and type 2 requires πR2 > 
π*R0. By assumption, type 0 prefers π*R2 to π*R0 when type 2 sets 
π1 = π*R2. Therefore, we must have πR2 > π*R2. A parallel 
argument shows that πR1 > π*R0 (= π*R1).  
 
We now examine the relation between πRj, j = 1,2, and incumbent 
popularity, p. The allocations of type 2 and type 1 are given 
by the incentive compatibility conditions of type 0 and type 
2, written as equalities.  
 
Type 0:     P(p,0,0) [K + U(x*R0,π*R0,αR0) + δU(0)]  = 
            P(p,0,1) [K + U(xR2,πR2,αR0) + δU(0)]        (A.1')  
     
Type 2:     P(p,0,1) [K + U(xR2,πR2,αR2) + δU(2)]  = 
            P(p,1,0) [K + U(xR1,πR1+θ/γ1,αR2) + δU(2)].  (A.2')  
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(A.1') states that type 0 is indifferent between choosing π1 = 
π*R0 and being perceived as type 0, or choosing π1 = πR2 and 
being perceived as type 2. (A.2') states that type 2 is 
indifferent between choosing π1 = πR2 and being perceived as 
type 2, or choosing π1 = πR1+θ/γ1 and being perceived as type 1. 
(Type 2 must set π1 = πR1+θ/γ1 > πR1 in order to achieve x1 = xR1 
because the supply function of type 2 is less favourable than 
that of type 1.  
 
Inserting for economic welfare from (2) and omitting 
interaction terms between ΔP and U(j) yield (due to the 
assumption that economic welfare is small relative to the 
value of intrinsic power, they are dominated by interaction 
terms between ΔP and K): 
 
Type 0:   ΔP(p,2,0) K = P(p,0,1) [αR0(x*R0-xR2) 
          - (π*R0)2/2 + (πR2)2/2]                        (A.1) 
 
Type 2:   ΔP(p,1,2) K = P(p,1,0) [αR2(xR2-xR1) 
          - (πR2)2/2 + (πR1+θ/γ1)2/2].                   (A.2) 
 
From the supply function we have 
 
      x*R0-xR2 = γ1(π*R0-πR2) 
      xR2-xR1 = γ1(πR2-πR1) - θ. 
Inserting for x*R0-xR2 and xR2-xR1 in (A.1)-(A.2) gives 
  
  (πR2-π*R0)2/2 = [ΔP(p,2,0)/P(p,0,1)] K                 (A.3) 
 
  (πR1)2/2 - (π*R2-θ/γ1)πR1 = [ΔP(p,1,2)/P(p,1,0)] K +  
  (πR2)2/2 - π*R2πR2 + αR2θ - (θ/γ1)2/4.                  (A.4)  
     
As πR2 > π*R2 > π*R0, (A.3) implies that πR2 is increasing in 
ΔP(p,2,0)/P(p,0,1). ΔP(p,2,0)/P(p,0,1) can be approximated as  
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            Cf(-p+D)/[1-F(-p+D)], 
 
where C and D are constants which depend on the model's 
parameters but not on p, and f(.)/[1-F(.)] is the hazard rate. 
The hazard rate is monotonically increasing for a wide range 
of distribution functions, implying that ΔP(p,2,0)/P(p,0,1) 
and therefore πR2 are decreasing in p. It follows from a 
parallel argument that ΔP(p,1,2)/P(p,1,0) is also a decreasing 
function of p. 
 
(A.4) implies that πR1 is increasing in ΔP(p,1,2)/P(p,1,0) as 
πR1+θ/γ1 > π*R2. (If πR1+θ/γ1 ≤ π*R2 < πR2, then yR1 < yR2, in which 
case separation between type 2 and type 1 is not possible when 
ME1 > ME2.) πR1 is also increasing in πR2 because πR2 > π*R2. As 
both ΔP(p,1,2)/P(p,1,0) and πR2 are decreasing in p, it follows 
that πR1 is decreasing in p. 
 
b) θ < θ''. As for case a), the ranking of win probabilities 
and the ranking of marginal economic welfare are identical, 
but now type 2 has the highest win probability and the lowest 
cost of signalling. The proof for this case is parallel to the 
proof presented above; the only difference is that the roles 
of type 1 and type 2 are interchanged. 
 
c) θ' ≥ θ ≥ θ''. In this case, type 1 has the highest win 
probability, but type 2 has the lowest cost of signalling. 
Then several sequential equilibria survive the D1 criterion. 
 
ii) Left incumbent. The Spence-Mirrlees condition is not 
satisfied when party left is incumbent. The proof is therefore 
longer and more tedious than the proof for right incumbents. 
 
Throughout the proof, xj and πj denote the first period 
employment and inflation rates of type j in a fully separating 
equilibrium. In order to mimick type 1, the other types must 
set π1 = π1 + θ/γ1. Type 1 must set π1 = π0 - θ/γ1 to mimick 
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type 0 and π1 = π2 - θ/γ1 to mimick type 2. xP is the employment 
rate chosen by two or more types in an equilibrium where some 
or complete pooling occurs. πP is the corresponding inflation 
rate (πP-θ/γ1 when the incumbent is type 1, and P(xP) is the 
corresponding win probability. x', π', π'-θ/γ1 and P(x') 
denote, respectively, the employment rate, the inflation rate 
of type 0 and type 2, the inflation rate of type 1, and the 
win probability of an alternative allocation, i.e. an 
allocation which a potential equilibrium allocation is 
compared to.  
 
We first consider fully separating equilibria and show that 
the D1 criterion selects a unique equilibrium. We then show 
that equilibria with pooling are eliminated by the D1 
criterion.  
 
The incentive compatibility conditions of a fully separating 
equlibrium are 
 
Type 0:  P(p,0,0) [K + U(x0,π0,αL0) + δU(0)]  ≥ 
         P(p,1,0) [K + U(x1,π1+θ/γ1,αL0) + δU(0)]       (A.5') 
         P(p,0,0) [K + U(x0,π0,αL0) + δU(0)]  ≥ 
         P(p,0,1) [K + U(x2,π2,αL0) + δU(0)]            (A.6') 
 
Type 1:  P(p,1,0) [K + U(x1,π1,αL0) + δU(1)]  ≥ 
         P(p,0,0) [K + U(x0,π0-θ/γ1,αL0) + δU(1)]       (A.7')  
         P(p,1,0) [K + U(x1,π1,αL0) + δU(1)]  ≥ 
         P(p,0,1) [K + U(x2,π2-θ/γ1,αL0) + δU(1)]       (A.8')  
    
Type 2:  P(p,0,1) [K + U(x2,π2,αL2) + δU(2)]  ≥ 
         P(p,0,0) [K + U(x0,π0,αL2) + δU(2)]            (A.9') 
         P(p,0,1) [K + U(x2,π2,αL2) + δU(2)]  ≥ 
         P(p,1,0) [K + U(x1,π1+θ/γ1,αL2) + δU(2)],      (A.10') 
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(A.5') states that type 0 prefers x0 to x1, (A.6') states that 
type 0 prefers x0 to x2, etc. (A.5')-(A.10') are rewritten by 
inserting for economic welfare from (2) and omitting 
interaction terms between ΔP and economic welfare. 
 
Type 0:   ΔP(p,1,0) K ≤ P(p,1,0) [αL0(x0-x1) 
          - (π0)2/2 + (π1+θ/γ1)2/2]                      (A.5) 
          ΔP(p,2,0) K ≤ P(p,0,1) [αL0(x0-x2) 
          - (π0)2/2 + (π2)2/2]                           (A.6) 
 
Type 1:   ΔP(p,1,0) K ≥ P(p,1,0) [αL0(x0-x1) 
          - (π0-θ/γ1)2/2 + (π1)2/2]                      (A.7) 
          ΔP(p,2,1) K ≤ P(p,0,1) [αL0(x1-x2) 
           - (π1)2/2 + (π2-θ/γ1)2/2]                     (A.8) 
 
Type 2:   ΔP(p,2,0) K ≥ P(p,0,1) [αL2(x0-x2)  
          - (π0)2/2 + (π2)2/2]                           (A.9) 
          ΔP(p,2,1) K ≥ P(p,0,1) [αL2(x1-x2) 
          - (π1+θ/γ1)2/2 + (π2)2/2].                     (A.10) 
 
The following argument shows that (A.8) is superfluous. (A.5) 
and (A.7) imply π1 ≥ π0-θ/γ1 and therefore x1 ≥ x0, whereas 
(A.6) and (A.9) imply π0 ≥ π2 and x0 ≥ x2. Type 1 prefers x0 to 
x2 if 
  
          ΔP(p,2,0) K ≤ P(p,0,1) [αL0(x0-x2)  
          - (π0-θ/γ1)2/2 + (π2-θ/γ1)2/2].                (A.11) 
 
(A.11) is satisfied when (A.6) is satisfied and π0 ≥ π2. Type 1 
thus prefers x0 to x2 and, by (A.7), x1 to x0, implying that 
(A.8) is superfluous.  
 
A similar argument shows that (A.10) is superfluous: type 2 
prefers x2 to x0 and prefers x0 to x1 if x1 ≥ x0 and type 0 
prefers x0 to x1.  
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In a fully separating equilibrium, the type with the least 
favourable election prospects, type 0, sets first period 
inflation equal to the optimal short-run inflation rate. We 
therefore have π0 = π*L0. The corresponding employment rate is 
denoted x*L0. 
 
Inserting for π0 = π*L0 and x0 = x*L0 in (A.5) and (A.7) gives 
the set of possible allocations of type 1 in a fully 
separating equilibrium. Inserting for π0 = π*L0 and x0 = x*L0 in 
(A.6) and (A.9) gives the possible allocations of type 2.  
 
Consider first type 2. Let πL2 and πL2' denote the inflation 
rates for which (A.6) and (A.9) hold with equalities. Since 
π*L2 < π*L0 and, by assumption, type 0 prefers π*L2 to π*L0, (A.6) 
and (A.9) imply that π2 ∈ [πL2',πL2], where πL2' < πL2 < π*L2.  
 
The D1 criterion selects π2 = πL2 for the following reason. Let 
xL2 denote the employment rate corresponding to πL2. It follows 
from the definition of πL2 that type 0 is indifferent between 
choosing π1 = π*L0 and being perceived as neutral, or choosing 
π1 = πL2 and being perceived as moderate. Hence, type 0 prefers 
an alternative inflation rate, π' ≤ πL2, to πL2 and therefore to 
π*L0 if 
 
Type 0:       [P(x')-P(p,0,1)] K ≥ P(x') [αL0(xL2-x')  
              - (πL2)2/2 + (π')2/2].                    (A.12) 
  
Type 2 prefers π' to π2 if 
 
Type 2:       [P(x')-P(p,0,1)] K ≥ P(x') [αL2(x2-x')  
              - (π2)2/2 + (π')2/2].                     (A.13) 
 
Since π2 ≤ πL2 < π*L2, πL2 gives type 2 at least the same first 
period economic welfare as π2: αL2xL2 - (πL2)2/2 ≥ α2x2 - (π2)2/2. 
(A.13) is therefore satisfied when 
 
 
 34
 
Type 2:       [P(x')-P(p,0,1)] K ≥ P(x') [αL2(xL2-x')  
              - (πL2)2/2 + (π')2/2].                    (A.14) 
 
Since x' ≤ xL2, (A.14) is satisfied when (A.12) is satisfied. 
Therefore, (A.13) is satisfied when (A.12) is satisfied, 
implying that type 2 will deviate to y' if type 0 deviates to 
x'. It then follows from the D1 criterion that the voter will 
not believe the incumbent is type 0 when x' ≤ xL2 is observed. 
  
A similar argument shows that the voter will not believe the 
incumbent is type 1 when x' ≤ xL2 is observed. The voter will 
thus conclude that the incumbent is type 2. Since the win 
probability is the same, P(p,0,1), for all allocations which 
achieve separation (allocations where x2 ≤ xL2), type 2 
maximizes first period economic welfare by choosing π2 = πL2.  
 
A parallel argument applies to π1. Let π1 = πL1 and x1 = xL1 
denote the inflation and employment rates for which (A.5) 
holds with equality when π0 = π*L0 and x0 = x*L0. If x' ≥ xL1 is 
observed, the voter will believe the incumbent is type 1 
because type 1 always prefers x' when type 0 or type 2 prefer 
x'. Therefore, all allocations which achieve separation give 
the same win probability, P(p,1,0), implying that type 1 
chooses π1 = πL1.  
 
Before concluding that (πL0*,πL1,πL2) is an equilibrium outcome, 
we must check whether any of the types have incentives to 
deviate. We consider only allocations for which xL1 ≥ x' ≥ xL2 
since, from the preceding argument, we know that none of the 
types will want to set x1 > xL1 or x1 < xL2. A type j incumbent 
prefers an alternative allocation if 
 
Type 0:       [P(x')-P(p,0,0)] K ≥ P(x') [αL0(x*L0-x')  
              - (π*L0)2/2 + (π')2/2]                    (A.15) 
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Type 1:       [P(x')-P(p,1,0)] K ≥ P(x') [αL0(xL1-x')  
              - (πL1)2/2 + (π'-θ/γ1)2/2]                (A.16) 
 
Type 2:       [P(x')-P(p,0,1)] K ≥ P(x') [αL2(xL2-x')  
              - (πL2)2/2 + (π')2/2].                    (A.17) 
 
Since type 0 is indifferent between x*L0, xL1 and xL2, (A.15) can 
be written as 
 
Type 0:       [P(x')-P(p,1,0)] K ≥ P(x') [αL0(xL1-x')  
              - (πL1+θ/γ1)2/2 + (π')2/2]                (A.18) 
 
or as 
 
Type 0:       [P(x')-P(p,0,1)] K ≥ P(x') [αL0(xL2-x')  
              - (πL2)2/2 + (π')2/2].                    (A.19) 
 
Comparison of (A.16) and (A.18) shows that type 0 always 
prefers to deviate if type 1 prefers to deviate when x' ≤ xL1 
(in which case π' ≤ πL1+θ/γ1). Similarly, comparison of (A.17) 
and (A.19) shows that type 0 always prefers to deviate if type 
2 prefers to deviate and x' ≥ xL2. Hence, by the D1 criterion, 
the voter will believe the incumbent is type 0 if x', xL2 ≤ x' 
≤ x1, is observed, implying that none of the types will want to 
break the separating equilibrium. 
 
Finally, we must prove that the D1 criterion eliminates 
equilibria with pooling. Consider first a potential 
equilibrium where both type 0 and type 2 set x = xP and π1 = 
πP. Type j, j = 0,2, prefers an alternative allocation if 
 
Type 0:       [P(x')-P(xP)] K ≥ P(x) [αL0(xP-x')  
              - (πP)2/2 + (π')2/2]                      (A.20) 
   
Type 2:       [P(x')-P(xP)] K ≥ P(xP) [αL2(xP-x')  
              - (πP)2/2 + (π')2/2].                     (A.21) 
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Type 1 sets x1 = xP and π1 = πP-θ/γ1, or, if possible, chooses 
an allocation which yields higher utility. In either case, a 
necessary condition for deviation is 
 
Type 1:       [P(x')-P(xP)] K ≥ P(xP) [αL0(xP-x')  
              - (πP-θ/γ1)2/2 + (π'-θ/γ1)2/2].           (A.22) 
 
Comparison of (A.20)-(A.22) shows that both (A.20) and (A.22) 
imply (A.21) when x' < xP and π' < πP . Therefore, if the voter 
observes x' < xP, the voter will believe the incumbent is type 
2, implying that P(x') = P(p,0,1) > P(xP). Thus, by setting x1 
slightly below xP, type 2 (and type 0) can gain from deviation.  
 
A parallel argument eliminates equilibria where type 0 and 
type 1 choose the same employment rate: since type 1 has 
stronger incentives to raise employment than the two other 
types, the voter will conclude that the incumbent is type 1 if 
x' > xP is observed. Therefore, both type 0 and type 1 prefer 
to deviate by setting x1 slightly above xP.  
 
The last possibility is an equilibrium where type 1 and type 2 
choose xP and type 0 does not. It is straightforward to show 
that this case is not possible. The preceding analysis has 
established that type 0 and type 1 prefer different employment 
rates only if xP > x0, and that type 0 and type 2 prefer 
different employment rates only if xP < x0. Clearly both 
conditions cannot hold simultaneously. 
 
πL1 and πL2 are given by (A.5) and (A.9), written as equalities, 
when π0 = π*L0. Inserting from the supply function and 
rearranging terms give 
  
   (πL1)2/2 - (π*L0-θ/γ1)πL1 = [ΔP(p,1,0)/P(p,1,0)] K + E  
 
   (πL2)2/2 - π*L0πL2 = [ΔP(p,2,0)/P(p,0,1)] K + G, 
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where E and G are constants which depend on the model's 
parameters but not on p. Since πL1 > πL0*-θ/γ1, πL1 is increasing 
in ΔP(p,1,0)/P(p,1,0). πL2 is decreasing in ΔP(p,2,0)/P(p,0,1) 
as πL2 < πL0*. From the proof for right incumbents, we know that 
ΔP(p,1,0)/P(p,1,0) and ΔP(p,2,0)/P(p,0,1) are decreasing 
functions of p. Therefore, πL1 is decreasing in p, whereas πL2 
is increasing in p.  
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Appendix B 
 
i) Elections. The analysis is based on the following elections 
(quarterly output series are not available for New Zealand):  
 
US: 64:4,68:4,72:4,76:4,80:4,84:4,88:4,92:4,96:4 
Canada: 62:2,79:2,93:4 
UK: 64:4,92:2,97:2  
Germany: 72:4,76:4,80:4,87:1,94:4,98:3 
Australia: 66:4,69:4,72:4,80:4,87:3,90:1,93:1,96:1,98:4 
New Zealand: 72:4,75:4,78:4,81:4,84:3,87:3,90:4,93:4 
Sweden: 68:3,70:3,73:3,76:3,79:3,82:3,85:3,88:3,91:3, 
94:3,98:3 
Norway: 65:3,69:3,73:3,77:3,81:3,85:3,89:3 
 
Elections before the early sixties are not included due to 
lack of data on OECD unemployment and output growth. Elections 
in New Zealand after 1993 are excluded due to the introduction 
of a new electoral system. Norwegian elections after 1989 are 
excluded because the two-bloc party system disintegrated in 
the early nineties. The German unification election in 1990 is 
excluded due to breaks in macroeconomic series.  
 
ii) Polls. POLLt is computed in two steps. For each month 
during which polls were conducted, the average two-party/two-
bloc vote share of the government party/bloc is computed. POLLt 
is then set equal to the government's average monthly vote 
share. If no polls were conducted during quarter t, POLLt is 
computed by interpolation. 
 
For the US, POLLt is computed from Gallup and Harris 
presidential trial-heat polls. Prior to the conventions, party 
member preferences polls are used to select each party's 
front-runner, and the trial heats between the front-runners 
are taken to represent voter preferences.  
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The data sources are (data points computed by interpolation 
are listed in parentheses): 
 
US: Gallup Organization/Harris (87:3-88:1)   
Canada: Gallup Canada 
UK: Gallup Organization 
Germany: Allensbach 
Australia: Roy Morgan (65:1-65:2,65:4,68:1) 
New Zealand: NRB/Heylen (71:3,74:1) 
Sweden: SIFO (66:4-67:1)  
Norway: NSD (63:4,68:1-68:4,77:1-77:2)          
 
 
iii) Parties/blocs. 
 
US: Left: Democratic party. Right: Republican party 
Canada: Left: Liberal party. Right: Progressive Conservative 
party. 
UK: Left: Labour. Right: Conservative party. 
Germany: Left: Social Democrats, Free Democrats (-82:4), Green 
party (83:1-). Right: Christian Democrats, Free Democrats 
(83:1-). 
Australia: Left: Labour. Right: Liberal party, National/County 
party. 
New Zealand: Left: Labour. Right: National party. 
Sweden: Left: Social Democrats, Left Communist party/Left 
party, Green party (81:1-). Right: Conservative party, Liberal 
party, Centre party, Christian Democratic party (84:1-), New 
Democratic party (91:2-94:3). 
Norway: Left: Labour, Socialist Left party. Right: 
Conservative party, Liberal party, Christian People's party, 
Centre party, Progress party (73:2-). 
 
iv) Economic variables. Unemployment, UNit, is: US, Canada, 
Australia: total unemployment scaled by civilian labour force. 
UK: registered unemployment scaled by total labour force. 
 
 
 40
Germany: registered unemployment scaled by civilian labour 
force. New Zealand: registered unemployment scaled by sum of 
employment and registered unemployment. Sweden: total 
unemployment scaled by total labour force. Norway: 
standardized unemployment rate. The unemployment rate of 
Sweden is seasonally adjusted by myself, the others by OECD. 
The OECD variable is weighted average unemployment in the six 
largest economies (not Germany due to the unification) using 
as weights each country's share of total nominal GDP. 
Following Alesina et al. (1997), the country in the left-hand 
side of the regression is excluded when computing OECD 
unemployment.  
 
Output growth, GDPit, is seasonally adjusted quarterly rate of 
change of real GDP. Computation of the OECD variable is 
analogous to unemployment. 
 
Before 1993, German data refer to West Germany. All economic 
variables are from OECD Main Economic Indicators. 
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Table 1 
Pooled regression estimates 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Change in unemployment 
 
                          Right               Left 
                       governments         governments 
                      --------------      --------------  
                       j=A      j=B        j=A      j=B  
 
ΔUNit-1               0.430    0.429      0.246    0.247 
                     (7.415)  (7.362)    (3.233)  (3.253) 
ΔUNit-2               0.183    0.185      0.175    0.176 
                   (2.810)  (2.826)    (3.502)  (3.508) 
ΔUNit-3              -0.065   -0.060      0.098    0.099 
                     (1.277)  (1.172)    (1.802)  (1.826) 
ΔUNit-5                                  -0.131   -0.128 
                                         (2.535)  (2.469) 
ΔUNOit                0.309    0.320      0.367    0.366 
                     (3.997)  (4.174)    (5.226)  (5.150) 
GERMANYi                                  0.071    0.068 
                                         (2.368)  (2.249) 
NEW ZEALANDi                              0.117    0.115 
                                         (2.139)  (2.106)   
SWEDENi               0.109    0.101 
                     (1.678)  (1.556) 
ELE4it HIGHjit-4     -0.029   -0.040     -0.023   -0.013   
                     (0.841)  (1.131)    (0.527)  (0.301) 
ELE4it LOWjit-4      -0.127   -0.110      0.012   -0.007 
                     (2.931)  (2.563)    (0.214)  (0.139)  
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Observations                449                 469      
AR(1) [χ2(1)]         0.002    0.215      0.707    0.606    
AR(2) [χ2(2)]         0.857    1.019      0.708    0.607 
R2adj                 0.377    0.375      0.253    0.252  
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 47
Output growth 
 
                         Right               Left 
                      governments         governments 
                      --------------      --------------  
                       j=A      j=B        j=A      j=B  
 
GDPit-1              -0.168   -0.166 
                     (2.060)  (2.031) 
GDPOit                0.560    0.559      0.380    0.380 
                     (5.424)  (5.389)    (5.008)  (5.019) 
GDPOit-1              0.174    0.191      0.146    0.148  
                     (1.758)  (1.882)    (1.881)  (1.908) 
UKi                                      -0.380   -0.380  
                                         (2.273)  (2.272)  
GERMANYi                                 -0.237   -0.230 
                                         (1.471)  (1.429) 
AUSTRALIAi            0.515    0.475      0.180    0.175 
                     (2.896)  (2.729)    (1.203)  (1.173)   
SWEDENi              -0.423   -0.440 
                     (2.051)  (2.113) 
NORWAYi               0.275    0.260 
                     (1.323)  (1.228)                     
ELE4it HIGHjit-4      0.133    0.136     -0.103   -0.142   
                     (0.652)  (0.713)    (0.777)  (1.091) 
ELE4it LOWjit-4       0.493    0.531     -0.296   -0.220 
                     (3.619)  (3.485)    (1.621)  (1.137)  
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Observations                390                 432      
AR(1) [χ2(1)]         0.126    0.115      0.000    0.002    
AR(2) [χ2(2)]         0.157    0.129      0.606    0.470 
R2adj                 0.147    0.148      0.094    0.093  
 
____________________________________________________________  
Quarterly observations. t-statistics (absolute values, White-
corrected for heteroscedasticity) in parentheses. Data points 
(early elections are omitted, see Appendix B): US (62:1-98:4), 
Canada (61:3-98:4), UK (63:1-98:4), Germany (71:3-89:4,94:3-
98:4), Australia (65:3-98:4), New Zealand (71:1-94:4) (only 
unemployment), Sweden (67:1-98:4), Norway (64:1-91:4). 
Constant included in all regressions. A(1) and AR(2): Breusch-
Godfrey LM tests of autocorrelation.       
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Table 2  
Robustness tests. Right governments 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Change in unemployment 
 
 
                         r = 3              r = 5a  
                      --------------     --------------  
                       j=A      j=B       j=A      j=B  
 
ELE4it HIGHjit-r     -0.025   -0.004    -0.029   -0.014   
                     (0.746)  (0.103)   (0.714)  (0.343) 
 
ELE4it LOWjit-r      -0.137   -0.146    -0.098   -0.112 
                     (3.068)  (3.563)   (2.166)  (2.530)  
 
 
 
                       p = 0.30           p = 0.50  
                      --------------     --------------  
                       j=A      j=B       j=A      j=B  
 
ELE4it HIGHjit-4     -0.049   -0.046     0.002   -0.022   
                     (1.539)  (1.372)   (0.048)  (0.628) 
 
ELE4it LOWjit-4      -0.120   -0.125    -0.131   -0.119 
                     (2.272)  (2.532)   (3.538)  (2.919)  
 
 
 
                         N = 3               N = 5a  
                      --------------     --------------  
                       j=A      j=B       j=A      j=B  
 
ELENit HIGHjit-4     -0.007   -0.031    -0.028    0.001   
                     (0.169)  (0.751)   (0.889)  (0.039) 
 
ELENit LOWjit-4      -0.124   -0.091    -0.108   -0.130 
                     (2.736)  (2.058)   (2.733)  (3.587)  
 
____________________________________________________________ 
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Output growth 
 
                          r = 3              r = 5a  
                      --------------     --------------  
                       j=A      j=B       j=A      j=B  
 
ELE4it HIGHjit-r      0.114    0.116     0.213    0.248   
                     (0.557)  (0.611)   (0.968)  (1.171) 
 
ELE4it LOWjit-r       0.525    0.569     0.637    0.633 
                     (4.141)  (3.941)   (4.311)  (4.455)  
 
 
 
                       p = 0.30           p = 0.50  
                      --------------     --------------  
                       j=A      j=B       j=A      j=B  
 
ELE4it HIGHjit-4      0.140    0.095     0.030    0.178   
                     (0.753)  (0.535)   (0.118)  (0.902) 
 
ELE4it LOWjit-4       0.575    0.713     0.491    0.444 
                     (3.979)  (5.021)   (4.162)  (2.961)  
 
 
 
                         N = 3              N = 5a  
                      --------------     --------------  
                       j=A      j=B       j=A      j=B  
 
ELENit HIGHjit-4      0.182    0.263     0.109    0.134   
                     (0.834)  (1.268)   (0.569)  (0.769) 
 
ELENit LOWjit-4       0.674    0.614     0.463    0.475 
                     (4.690)  (3.758)   (3.717)  (3.369)  
 
____________________________________________________________ 
aSince Pjit, j = A,B, is computed for seven quarters before the 
election quarter, I set N = 3 when r = 5 and r = 3 when N = 5.  
Other notes: see table 1. 
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Table 3  
Instrumental variables estimates. Right governments 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
                      Change in       
                     Unemployment        Output growth 
                      ---------------     ---------------                        j=A       j=B        j=A     j=B  
  
ELE4it HIGHjit-4     -0.021    -0.001      0.184    0.078     
                     (0.552)   (0.021)    (1.149)  (0.418)    
 
ELE4it LOWjit-4      -0.137    -0.150      0.436    0.614    
                     (2.884)   (2.421)    (3.149)  (4.065)   
 
____________________________________________________________  
Instruments: Level, square and cube of ELE4it POLLit-4, 
ELE4it POLLit-5 and ELE4it POLLit-6. Other notes: see table 1. 
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Table 4  
Results for countries with and without fixed electoral terms. 
Right governments 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Change in unemployment 
 
 
                     Countries with       Countries without 
                   fixed electoral term   fixed electoral term  
                   --------------------   --------------------- 
                       j=A      j=B            j=A      j=B  
  
ELE4it HIGHjit-4     -0.060   -0.058         -0.013   -0.037   
                     (1.227)  (0.936)        (0.268)  (0.870) 
 
ELE4it LOWjit-4      -0.140   -0.128         -0.104   -0.096 
                     (2.029)  (2.185)        (2.111)  (1.502)  
 
 
 
Output growth 
 
                    Countries with        Countries without 
                   fixed electoral term   fixed electoral term 
                   --------------------   --------------------- 
                       j=A      j=B            j=A      j=B  
  
ELE4it HIGHjit-4      0.396    0.325         -0.124   -0.047   
                     (1.220)  (0.935)        (0.467)  (0.236) 
 
ELE4it LOWjit-4       0.728    0.760          0.345    0.414 
                     (3.232)  (3.600)        (2.041)  (1.807)  
 
_____________________________________________________________  
Countries with fixed electoral terms: US, New Zealand, Sweden, 
Norway. Countries without fixed electoral terms: UK, Canada, 
Germany, Australia. Other notes: see table 1.  
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Table 5. Results for high and low CBI countries.  
         Right governments 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Change in unemployment 
 
                         High CBI             Low CBI  
                        countries           countries 
                      --------------      --------------  
                       j=A      j=B        j=A      j=B  
 
ELE4it HIGHjit-4     -0.046   -0.085     -0.016    0.060   
                     (1.078)  (1.985)    (0.206)  (0.860) 
 
ELE4it LOWjit-4      -0.125   -0.059     -0.134   -0.186 
                     (1.951)  (0.884)    (2.395)  (3.299)  
 
 
 
Output growth 
 
                         High CBI             Low CBI  
                        countries           countries 
                      --------------      --------------  
                       j=A      j=B        j=A      j=B  
 
ELE4it HIGHjit-4      0.302    0.306     -0.462   -0.305   
                     (1.700)  (1.793)    (0.800)  (0.721) 
 
ELE4it LOWjit-4       0.391    0.378      0.581    0.691 
                     (1.948)  (1.643)    (2.976)  (3.517)  
 
_____________________________________________________________  
High CBI countries: US, Canada, Germany, Australia, New 
Zealand (90:1-94:4). Low CBI countries: UK, New Zealand  
(71:3-89:4), Sweden, Norway. Other notes: see table 1. 
 
 
